Maria Bittner, Rutgers http://www.users.cloud9.net/~mbittner NASSLLI 2016 Rutgers, New Brunswick NJ q The reference of an indexical is determined by the utterance context-e.g. if someone says 'I am hungry', the indexical pronoun 'I' refers to the speaker, while the indexical present tense of the verb 'am' refers to the speech time. q Since the seminal work by Kaplan 1979 context-dependence has been analyzed in terms of two formally unrelated parameters: § utterance context (static) for indexical reference § variable assignment (static or dynamic) for anaphoric reference.

On this static view, indexical reference does not involve any context change, and it

bears no relation to anaphora. This view still prevails not only in static theories (e.g.

Schlenker 2003), but also in most dynamic theories (e.g. Kamp's DRT, where anaphors

refer to current values of variables, while indexicals refer to static contextual anchors). q A more unified dynamic view is implicit in the commonplace effect of Stalnaker 1978 and explicit in Update with Centering (Bittner 2007, 2011). On this view, speaking up makes that very speech event available for discourse reference, e.g. by indexicals. Thus, indexical reference crucially involves not only context dependence, but also context change-just like anaphora.

q Unifying generalization: Both anaphors and indexicals refer to currently salient discourse entities: § mentioning something focuses attention on the mentioned entity and thereby makes that entity available for discourse reference by anaphors (see Grosz et al. 1995, Bittner 2001) § speaking up focuses attention on that speech event and thereby makes that event available for discourse reference by indexicals (see Stalnaker 1978, Bittner 2007) q No Kaplan dichotomy: Both indexicals and anaphors refer to discourse entities (drefs) made salient by prior updates. q Unified formal analysis: Instead of two formally unrelated parameters, the same dynamically updated dref hierarchy accounts for both indexical and anaphoric reference.

Main goal: Argue for the DYNAMIC VIEW, based on cross-linguistic evidence: q In Kalaallisut, grammatical centering system marks indexical persons (1st and 2nd) as 'inherent topics'. This is a mystery on the static view, but can be explained on the DYNAMIC VIEW. q In Slavey, certain indexicals in the scope of certain attitude verbs (e.g. yenįwę 'want') can take the perspective of the attitude holder instead of the speaker. This, too, can be explained on the DYNAMIC VIEW, under plausible assumptions: § by universal default, indexicals are interpreted from the perspective of the current speech event (speaker's perspective). § Slavey lexicon includes: o perspective-shifting attitude verbs, which can update the top-ranked perspectival dref to the attitudinal state of the subject (attitude holder's perspective) for the duration of the complement. o shiftable indexicals, interpreted from the perspective of the currently top-ranked perspectival dref.
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In Kalaallisut pronominal arguments (subjects, objects, and possessors) are expressed by means of person inflections. Anaphoric inflections refer to the currently top-ranked individual in the center or background of attention, as specified by three gramm. systems q form of 3rd person inflection specifies centering status of antecedent dref, e.g. § -ni '3S⊤' v. -a(t) '3S⊥' anaphora to topical v. background 3rd person q matrix clause moods specify illocutionary force in relation to ⊤-subject, e.g. § -pu 'DEC⊤' assertion of at-issue fact about ⊤-subject

§ -pa 'DEC⊤⊥' assertion of at-issue fact abt ⟨⊤-subject, ⊥-object⟩ q dependent clause moods specify centering status of dependent subject, e.g. § -ga 'FCT⊤' v. -mm 'FCT⊥' not-at-issue fact about ⊤-subject v. ⊥-subject § -gu 'HYP⊤' v. -pp 'HYP⊥' hypothesis about ⊤-subject v. ⊥-subject § -ganga 'HAB⊤' v. -gang 'HAB⊥' habit of ⊤-subject v. ⊥-subject § -llu 'ELA⊤' v. -tu 'ELA⊥' elaboration of ⊤-subject v. ⊥-subject 3rd person noun phrases are interpreted as recentering updates, i.e. updates that (re)introduce ⊤or ⊥-antecedents for anaphoric 3⊤ or 3⊥ inflections.

(1) i. Ippassaq atuartut qimussir-llu-tik sukkanniut-pu-t.

yesterday school.kids⊤ drive.dog.sled-ELA⊤-3P⊤ race.each.other-DEC⊤-3P

(elaboration of ⊤) (at-issue fact abt ⊤)

Yesterday the school kids⊤ had a dogsled race.

ii. Ole-p ikinnguta-a ajugaa-ga-mi nuannaar-pu-q.

[Ole-ERG⊥ friend-3S⊥]⊤ win-FCT⊤-3S⊤ happy-DEC⊤-3S

(not-a.i. fact abt ⊤) (at-issue fact abt ⊤)

Ole⊥'s friend⊤ won, so he⊤ (= friend) was happy.

ii'. Ole-p ikinngun-ni ajugaa-mm-at nuannaar-pu-q.

[Ole-ERG⊤ friend-3S⊤]⊥ win-FCT⊥-3S⊥ happy-DEC⊤-3S

(not-a.i. fact abt ⊥) (at-issue fact abt ⊤)

Ole⊤'s friend⊥ won, so he⊤ (= Ole) was happy.

Observation 1 In dependent clauses, 3⊤ or 3⊥ subjects select ⊤-moods or ⊥-moods, respectively (see (1ii, ii')), whereas indexical subjects (1st, 2nd person) always select ⊤-moods (see (2)). e.g. ! CONTEXT: Yesterday the school kids⊤ had a dogsled race. (2) a. Ajugaa-ga-ma nuannaar-pu-nga. ditto for HYP/HAB-

win-FCT⊤-1S happy-DEC⊤-1S -1/

I won, so I was happy.

b. Ajugaa-ga-ma Ole nuannaar-pu-q. ditto for HYP/HAB-

win-FCT⊤-1S Ole⊤ happy-DEC⊤-3S -1/

I won, so Ole⊤ was happy.

c.* Ajugaa-mm-ma ... ditto for HYP/HAB-

win-FCT⊥-1S -1/

Observation 2 ! In dependent transitives, anaphoric arguments (3rd person) compete for ⊤-status, whereas ... e.g. CONTEXT: Yesterday the school kids⊤ had a dogsled race. (3) a. Aka-p Bo ajugaa-vvigi-ga-mi-uk nuannaar-pu-q.

ditto for HYP/HAB-

Aka-ERG⊤ Bo⊥ win-tv-FCT⊤-3S⊤-3S⊥ happy-DEC⊤-3S

Aka⊤ beat Bo⊥, so he⊤ (= Aka) was happy.

b. Bo Aka-p ajugaa-vvigi-mm-a-ni nuannaar-nngit-la-q. ditto for HYP/HAB-

Bo⊤ Aka-ERG⊥ win-tv-FCT⊥-3S⊥-3S⊤ happy-not-DEC⊤-3S

Aka⊥ beat Bo⊤, so he⊤ (= Bo) wasn't happy.

c.* ... ajugaa-vvigi-ga-mi-ni ... ditto for HYP/HAB-

win-tv-FCT⊤-3S⊤-3S⊤

Observation 2 ! ... indexical arguments (1st, 2nd person) do not compete for ⊤-status. e.g. compare *(3c) v. ü(4), (4') CONTEXT: Yesterday the school kids⊤ had a dogsled race. (3) c.* ... ajugaa-vvigi-ga-mi-ni ... ditto for HYP/HAB-

win-tv-FCT⊤-3S⊤-3S⊤

(4) Aka ajugaa-vvigi-ga-n-ni nuannaar-nngit-la-q. ditto for HYP/HAB-

Aka⊤ win-tv-FCT⊤-1S-3S⊤ happy-not-DEC⊤-3S -1/

I defeated Aka⊤, so he⊤ (= Aka) wasn't happy. (4') Ajugaa-vvigi-ga-kkit nuannaar-nngit-la-tit. ditto for HYP/HAB-

win-tv-FCT⊤-1S.2S happy-not-DEC⊤-2S -1/

I defeated you, so you aren't happy.
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Update semantics (Veltman 1990/1996): "You know the meaning of a sentence if you know the change it brings about in the information state of anyone who accepts the news conveyed by it." Centering-based anaphora (Bittner 2001ff; cf. Grosz et al 1995, Dekker 1994) update keeps track of ranked dref entities in the center and background of attention q entity-level anaphoric terms: ⊤ (ctr), ⊤′ (2nd ctr), ⊥ (bck), ⊥′ (2nd bck) q set-level anaphoric terms: ⊤⇒ (ctr set), ⊥⇒ (bck set)

central drefs backgr. drefs

⟨ ⟨a1, a2, ..., an⟩, ⟨b1, b2, ..., bm⟩ ⟩ structured list

Info-state (about current dref entities & current ranking) is a set of structured lists

q minimal info-state (no drefs) absurd info-state (e.g. false discourse)

Sample model, M: %ole& = ☺ %win& = {☻}

Updates of minimal info-state c0 (no relevant drefs) by (1ii) on M:

⟨⟨⟩, ⟨⟩⟩ (1ii) Ole⊥'s friend⊤ won, so he⊤ (= friend) was happy.

[Ole-ERG⊥ friend-3S⊥]⊤ win-FCT⊤-3S⊤ happy-DEC⊤-3S

so (1ii) is true in c0 on M

Same model, M: %ole& = ☺ %win& = {☻}

Updates of same input c0 (no relevant drefs) by (1ii') on M:

⟨⟨⟩, ⟨⟩⟩ (1ii') Ole⊤'s friend⊥ won, so he⊤ (= Ole) was happy.

[Ole-ERG⊤ friend-3S⊤]⊥ win-FCT⊥-3S⊥ happy-DEC⊤-3S ⊤[x| x = ole]; [x| friend.of⟨x, ⊤⟩]; [win⟨⊥⟩]; [happy⟨⊤⟩]

so (1ii') is false in c0 on M
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Typed dref entities (see Bittner 2001ff)

dref entity: x (individual) e (event) s (state)

UC variable: x e s Centering-based anaphora (see Bittner 2001ff), e.g.!

ctr. of attn. bckg. of attn.

⟨⟨s1, x1, e0⟩, ⟨e2, e1, s2⟩⟩ dref hierarchy

⊤σ ⊤δ ⊤ε ⊥ε ⊥′ε ⊥σ typed anaphors Reference to functionally dependent entities (á la Moens & Steedman 1988)! Introducing a dref entity licenses discourse reference to certain ƒ-values, e.g.:

θe time of event e θs time of state s

we consequent state of event e (ws undefined)

↑e central individual in event e ↑s central individual in state s

↓e background individual in event e ↓s background individual in state s

Start-up update (Bittner 2011)! Speaking up (e0) focuses attention, giving rise to (e0-)minimal info-state: {⟨⟨e0⟩, ⟨⟩⟩}

cf. commonplace effect of speech acts (Stalnaker 1978, p. 323; MB emphasis): "... when I speak, I presuppose that others know I am speaking [...]. This fact, too, can be exploited in the conversation, as when Daniels says I am bald, taking it for granted that his audience can figure out who is being said to be bald. I mention this commonplace way that assertions change the context in order to make clear that the context on which an assertion has its essential effect is not defined by what is presupposed before the speaker begins to speak, but will include any information which the speaker assumes his audience can infer from the performance of the speech act."

Basic ideas (Bittner 2007)! Indexicals refer to ƒ-values of central view point (discourse initially, value of ⊤ε): 1S refers to ⊤ε-speaker (↑⊤ε), 2S to ⊤ε-addressee (↓⊤ε), PRS to ⊤ε-time (θ⊤ε), ... e.g. c

⟨⟨e0⟩, ⟨⟩⟩ e0-speaker speaks up (5) I am hungry.

S be.PRS hungry.

c

⟨⟨e0⟩, ⟨s1⟩⟩ Model for (5) Dref entity Symbol: Conditions

● ⊤e0: e0-speaker (↑e0) speaks up

–––––– s1 : s1-time includes e0-time (θe0 ⊆ θs1),

s1 is a state of e0-speaker (↑e0) being hungry

Basic idea (Bittner 2007)! Opening quote "... shifts central view point to quoted speech event Closing quote ..." restores just demoted central view point e.g. c

⟨⟨e0⟩, ⟨⟩⟩ e0-speaker speaks up (6) You said to me:

S say.PST to 1S

[e| θe < θ⊤ε, speak.to⟨e, ↓⊤ε, ↑⊤ε⟩, ...]; (ignoring modal reference)

c

" I am hungry. "

S be.PRS hungry.
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Observation 1 In dependent clauses, 3⊤ or 3⊥ subjects select ⊤or ⊥-moods, respectively, ... Explanation q dependent mood introduces a topic state for comment by matrix clause q topic state is related by ⊤-mood to ⊤-subject (1'a), or ⊥-mood, to ⊥-subject (1'b) e.g. (1') a. Aka⊤ won, so⊤ (topic state: consequent state of Aka) ...

b. Aka⊥ won, so⊤ (topic state: subsequent state of non-Aka) ...

Observation 1 ... whereas indexical subjects (1st, 2nd person) always select ⊤-moods. Explanation. centering parallel: indexical subject (ƒ⊤ε) ~ 3⊤ subject (⊤δ) e.g. (2') a. I won, so⊤ (topic state: consequent state of ↑⊤ε) (I was happy)

win-FCT⊤-1S

b. I won, so⊤ (topic state: subsequent state) (Ole⊤ was happy)

c.* win-FCT⊥-1S ... (* because there is no indexical ⊥-subject)

Observation 2 ! In dependent transitives, anaphoric arguments compete for ⊤-status, whereas ... Explanation. q Kalaallisut transitives require disjoint arguments, e.g. [⊥δ ≠ ⊤δ] in (3'b) q this requirement is absurd if the arguments co-refer, e.g. [⊤δ ≠ ⊤δ] in *(3'c) (3') b. Aka⊥ beat Bo⊤, so⊤ ...

c. *win-tv-FCT⊤-3S⊤-3S⊤

[⊤δ ≠ ⊤δ]; [e| beat⟨e, ⊤δ, ⊤δ⟩, e < ⊤ε]; ⊤[s| ...] Observation 2 ! ... whereas indexical arguments do not compete for ⊤-status. Explanation. q disjointness not absurd for indexical and 3⊤ arguments, e.g. [↑⊤ε ≠ ⊤δ] in (4'a) q disjointness not absurd for different indexical arguments, e.g. [↑⊤ε ≠ ↓⊤ε] in (4'b) (4') a. I beat Bo⊤, so⊤ ...

b. I beat you, so⊤ ...

win-tv-FCT⊤-1S.2S [↑⊤ε ≠ ↓⊤ε]; [e| beat⟨e, ↑⊤ε, ↓⊤ε⟩, e < ⊤ε]; ⊤[s| ...] Ø Anaphora & indexicality: Kalaallisut puzzle Ø Anaphoric reference to top entities (UC0) Ø Indexical reference to top view points (UCε) Ø Puzzle solved: Indexicals as 'inherent topics' Ø Attitude states as top view points: Slavey data Ø Conclusion

q Recall commonplace effect of speech acts (Stalnaker 1978, p. 323):

"... when I speak, I presuppose that others know I am speaking [...]. This fact, too,

can be exploited in the conversation, as when Daniels says I am bald, taking it for

granted that his audience can figure out who is being said to be bald." q Extend this idea to attitude states (Bittner 2007; cf. Lewis 1979)

When I (consciously) believe or want something, I am aware of being in this

attitudinal state. This fact, too, can be used to characterize the propositional object of

my attitude. For example, if I want to win, I am in a state of desire that will be satisfied

if and when the experiencer of this mental state wins. I can be aware of having this

de se desire, even if I suffer from amnesia and don't know who I am. All I need to be

aware of is the attitudinal state itself.

Rice (1986) on Slavey (Northern Athapaskan) q In complements of certain attitude verbs, certain person inflections may take the perspective of the subject (attitude holder) instead of the speaker. q Indexical adverbs (e.g. 'today', 'tomorrow') never shift q The attitude verb determines which persons, if any, may shift, e.g.

NO-SHIFT: -egodįhshǫ 'know' always: speaker's 1, 2,

IV-SHIFT: yenįwę 'want' ü: subject's (i.e. attitude holder's) 1, 3,

but always speaker's

TV-SHIFT: -udeli 'want' ü: subject's (i.e. attitude holder's) 1, 3,

but always speaker's

matrix object = complement arg

All Slavey examples from Rice (1986)

(7) John ?erákie?ǐe wihsį gú kodihshǫ. NO-SHIFT

John [parka 1S.make C] 3S.know

John knows that I made a parka. (speaker's '1S')

(8) a. hįdowedzíné k'e rírawohjá yenįwę. IV-SHIFT

[tomorrow on 1S.OPT.return] 3S.want

He wants to (subject's '1S') return tomorrow (speaker's 'tomorrow')

b. bets'ę ráwǫdí yenįwę.

[3S.to 2S.OPT.help] 3S.want

He wants you (speaker's '2S') to help me/her (subject's '3S')

(8) b. bets'ę ráwǫdí yenįwę. IV-SHIFT

[3S.to 2S.OPT.help] 3S.want

He wants you (speaker's '2S') to help me/her (subject's '3S')

(9) (underlined arguments co-refer) TV-SHIFT

a. sets'ę ráwǫdi sudeli.

[1S.to 3S.OPT.help] 3S.want.1S

He wants me (speaker's 1S = subject's '3S') to help him (subject's '1S')

b. bets'ę ráwǫdí sudeli.

[3S.to 2S.OPT.help] 3S.want.1S

He wants you (speaker's '2S') to help me (speaker's 1S = subject's '3S')

q Slavey pronouns are anchored to the top-ranked view point dref (either the current speech event ⊤ε, or the currently central attitude state ⊤σ) for which their function is defined (i.e. function ↑(*) for 1st and 3rd person, ↓(*) for 2nd person) q indexical-shifting attitude verbs optionally update the top perspectival dref to their own attitude state ⇒ complement 1st and 3rd are anchored to ↑⊤σ (attitude holder's 1st or 3rd, as in (8)–(9)) q attitude states have no addressee ⇒ ↓⊤σ undefined ⇒ complement 2nd refers to ↓⊤ε (speaker's 2nd, i.e. addressee, as in (8b), (9b)) q tv-shift attitudes are de re, i.e. relate attitude holder (↑⊤σ) to object res,

e.g. in (9a, b), matrix object 1S (speaker)

= complement 3S (attitude holder's res: 'her')
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q Cross-linguistic evidence favors the dynamic view of indexicality. Just like anaphora, indexical reference involves not only context dependence (on the input dref hierarchy), but also context change (setting up that hierarchy). For indexicals, the relevant dref is normally introduced simply by the act of speaking up; for anaphors, it is introduced by the antecedent expression. q In Kalaallisut, the dynamic view explains parallels drawn by nominal centering between indexical reference (to 1st or 2nd persons) and topic-oriented anaphora (to topical 3rd person, 3⊤) q In Slavey, perspective-shifting attitude verbs suggest that, not only speech events, but also attitude states can serve as perspectival drefs for indexicals. q Running theme: Evidence from under-studied languages may substantially change our view of much studied phenomena (such as nominal anaphora, indexicality, ...)

q Basic ideas! § Cross-linguistic evidence shows that temporal reference involves grammatical centering systems that update or refer to top-level temporal drefs (e.g. topic times in tense-based English; topic states in aspect-based Mandarin; background events in both) § Logical representation in UC0 extended with temporal drefs (events, states, times) and aspectual algebra (UCτ) q Suggested readings § Bach, E. 1986. Event algebra. Linguistics and Philosophy 9:5–16. § Bittner, M. in press. Topic states in Mandarin discourse. NACCL-25 (2013). § Moens, M. and Steedman, M. 1988. Temporal ontology and temporal reference. Computational Linguistics 14:15–28. § Partee, B. 1973. Some structural analogies between tenses and pronouns in English. Journal of Philosophy 70:601–9 § Webber, B. 1988. Tense as discourse anaphor. Comp. Linguistics 14:61–73.

Bittner, M. 2014. Perspectival discourse referents for indexicals. SULA 7. Bittner, M. 2011. Time and modality without tenses or modals. In: Tense

across Languages (R. Musan & M. Rathert, eds.), pp. 147–88. Niemeyer. Bittner, M. 2007. Online update: Temporal, modal, and de se anaphora in

polysynthetic discourse. Direct Compositionality (C. Barker & P. Jacobson,

eds.), pp. 363–404. Oxford University Press. Bittner, M. 2001. Surface composition as bridging. J. of Semantics 18:127– 77. Grosz, B. et al. 1995. Centering: A framework for modeling the local coherence

of discourse. Computational Linguistics 21:203–25.

Kamp, H. 1985. Context, thought, and communication. Proc. of the Aristotelian

Society 85:239–61. Kamp, H. 1981. Événements, représentations discursives et référence

temporelle. Langages 64:39–64. Kaplan, D. 1979. On the logic of demonstratives. J. of Philosophical Logic 8.

Lewis, D. 1979. Attitudes de dicto and de se. Philosophical Review 88:418–46. Moens, M. and M. Steedman. 1988. Temporal ontology and temporal reference.

Computational Linguistics 14:15–28. Rice, K. 1986. Some remarks on direct and indirect discourse in Slave

(Northern Athapaskan). In: Direct and Indirect Speech (F. Coulmas, ed.), pp.

–76. de Gruyter. Schlenker, P. 2003. A plea for monsters. Linguistics and Philosophy 26:29–120. Stalnaker, R. 1978. Assertion. In Syntax and Semantics 9 (P. Cole, ed.), pp.

–32. Academic Press. Veltman. F. 1990. Defaults in update semantics. In: Conditionals, Defaults and

Belief Revision (H. Kamp, ed.), pp. 28–64. DYANA Report R2.5.A. Centre

for Cognitive Science, University of Edinburgh. Veltman, F. 1996. Defaults in update semantics. J. of Philosophical Logic